[ELECTION REFORM]: Dodd/McConnell/Ney/Hoyer letter re: voter-verified paper trails
March 3, 2004
Attention Members and Staff:
Dear Colleague:
As the principal authors of the Help America Vote Act (Public
Law 107-252) (HAVA), signed into law by President Bush on October 29, 2002,
we feel compelled to express our concerns about recent legislative efforts
that promise enhanced electronic voting system security. Various proposals
have been introduced in the House and Senate, but a common feature of these
bills is they would amend HAVA to require that all voting systems, including
electronic and computer-based systems, produce or accommodate a “voter
verified paper record.” Not only are such proposals premature, but they
would undermine essential HAVA provisions, such as the disability and
language minority access requirements, and could result in more, rather than
less, voter disenfranchisement and error.
We are certainly aware of the alleged concerns that have been
raised in recent months regarding security issues associated with
computer-based voting systems and technologies, especially Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) voting systems. These concerns are neither new nor
unanticipated by HAVA. To address security-related issues, HAVA creates a
Technical Guidelines Development Committee, chaired by the Director of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to assist the new
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in developing guidelines and standards
to ensure the reliability of the computer technologies being employed in
voting systems. These standards will focus not only on the security of
computer and network hardware and software and data storage, but also on the
detection and prevention of fraud and the protection of voter privacy.
Additionally, HAVA provides that the testing and certification of voting
system hardware and software must take place in accredited laboratories.
NIST initiated this process with a two-day public conference this past
December, 2003.
The goal of HAVA is to ensure that every eligible American has
an equal opportunity to cast a vote and have that vote counted. HAVA does
not mandate the use of DRE systems. It does require, however, that voting
systems be enhanced to avoid the errors and accessibility problems
associated with antiquated systems, such as punch cards. Computer-based
voting systems have a demonstrated track record of achieving this goal,
particularly for persons with disabilities. While there are risks associated
with any technology, the solution is not to rush to judgment by returning to
flawed systems. Rather, the answer is to allow the Commission, together with
the active input of election officials, computer experts, and civil rights
groups representing voter interests, to develop standards for ensuring the
security of all voting systems, as required under HAVA.
The proposals mandating a voter-verified paper record would
essentially take the most advanced generations of election technologies and
systems available and reduce them to little more than ballot printers. While
such an approach may be one way to address DRE security issues, it would, if
adopted, likely give rise to numerous adverse unintended consequences. Most
importantly, the proposals requiring a voter-verified paper record would
force voters with disabilities to go back to using ballots that provide
neither privacy nor independence, thereby subverting a hallmark of the HAVA
legislation. There must be voter confidence in the accuracy of an electronic
tally. However, the current proposals would do nothing to ensure greater
trust in vote tabulations but would be guaranteed to impose steep costs on
States and localities and introduce new complications into the voting process.
Questions regarding voting systems security, as well as many
others, need to be examined by the entity responsible for doing so under
existing law, the Election Assistance Commission, before Congress begins
imposing new requirements, just months before the 2004 presidential and
congressional elections, that have not been fully considered. The security
of voting technology is a non-partisan issue. We encourage you to allow HAVA
to be implemented as enacted and provide those who are charged with ensuring
the security of voting systems the time and flexibility needed to get the
job done effectively.
Sincerely,
S/REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT W. NEY
S/REPRESENTATIVE STENY HOYER
S/SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL
S/SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
